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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND CRIMINAL PROCEDUREMEDIA RIDE-ALONGS INTO THE HOME: CAN THEY SURVIVE A HEAD-ON
COLLISION BETWEEN FIRST AND FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS?

Wilson v.

Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
I. INTRODUCTION

Bad boys, bad boys, whatcha gonna do? Whatcha gonna do when they come
for you?'
Millions of viewers have tuned in nightly over the last decade to
experience the new phenomenon called "reality television."2 From the
safe confines of their living room easy chairs, viewers can participate in
daring rescue missions or observe actual police arrests on the beat and
in the home.'
Although popular with viewers, reality television
programming raises serious questions about personal privacy rights that
stand in the way of the public's right to know. The United States
Supreme Court ruled privacy rights may take precedence, holding in
Wilson v. Layne4 that the popular media ride-alongs 5 violate the Fourth
Amendment when the media accompanies law enforcement officers into
a home.6
This note examines the Wilson decision and the legal landscape
from which it arose. Focusing on the special deference traditionally
afforded to the home, the note then discusses Fourth Amendment
protections and the English common-law from which the Fourth
Amendment developed. It next examines media intrusions into the
home through the influx of reality programming and the tension such
intrusions raise between personal privacy and the First Amendment
guarantee to a free press. The note traces the development of lawsuits,
grounded in both tort law and the Fourth Amendment, resulting from
I.

See David E. Bond, Note, Police Liabilityfor the Media Ride-Along, 77 B.U. L.

REV. 825, 825 & n. I (1997). From Big Beat/Atlantic Records, Bad Boys is the theme
song to the Fox television program Cops. See id.
2. See Andrew Jay McClurg. Bringing Privacy Law Out ofthe Closet: A Tort Theory
of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 991 & n.I (1995).

Professor McClurg uses the label "reality television" to describe the "genre of [shows]
often featuring live video coverage of dramatic events." Id.
3.

See id

"Popular segments include footage of police officers stopping,

questioning, searching, or arresting motorists, and emergency response teams, such as

firefighters or paramedics, responding to calls for assistance." Id.
4. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
5. See Bond, supra note 1,at 825. A ride-along consists of "footage obtained
when television crews accompany police officers on patrol and film them in action."
See Bond, supra note I, at 825.
6. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 605.
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media ride-alongs. The note also considers an important affirmative
defense available to officers who have unwittingly violated a plaintiff's
protected rights, that of qualified immunity. In closing, the impact
Wilson will have on the media and reality programming, in particular, is
analyzed.
II. FACTS
In the early morning hours of April 16, 1992, a team of Deputy
United States Marshals and local county sheriffs raided the Maryland
home of Charles and Geraldine Wilson, pursuant to a valid search
warrant.7 The raid on the Wilson home was part of a national fugitive
apprehension program known as "Operation Gunsmoke." 8 This
program targeted Dominic Wilson, the son of Charles and Geraldine
Wilson, as a dangerous criminal wanted on probation violations for
previous felony charges of robbery, theft, and assault with intent to
commit robbery. 9 The Circuit Court for Montgomery County issued
three warrants for the arrest of Dominic Wilson, one for each probation
violation." Police computer "caution indicators" warned that Dominic
would likely be armed, resist arrest, and assault police." "
When the Wilsons' nine-year-old granddaughter opened the door
on the morning of May 16, she found officers aiming their guns at her. 2
7. See id. at 606-08 (1999). The team was composed of Joseph L. Perkins and
James A. Olivo of the United States Marshals Service and Mark A. Collins, Brian E.
Roynestad, and Eric E. Runion of the Montgomery County, Maryland Sheriff's
Department. See Wilson v. Layne, 110 F.3d 1071, 1072 (4th Cir. 1997), aft'den banc,
141 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 1998), aff'd, 526 U.S. 603 (1999). The team's supervisor was
Respondent Harry Layne. See id.
at 1073.
8. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 606; Brief for Federal Respondents Harry Layne, James
A. Olivo, and Joseph L. Perkins at 1, Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (No. 9883). The aim of this program was to join federal and local law enforcement officers in
an effort to apprehend "armed individuals wanted on federal and/or state and local
warrants for serious drug and other violent felonies." Wilson, 526 U.S. at 606. The
program resulted in the arrest of over 3300 criminals in 40 metropolitan areas. See id.;
Brief for Federal Respondents at 1, Wilson (No. 98-83).
9. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 606.
10. See id.; Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1072. The warrant stated: "THE STATE OF
MARYLAND, TO ANY DULY AUTHORIZED PEACE OFFICER, GREETINGS:
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED TO TAKE DOMINIC JEROME WILSON IF
HE/SHE BE FOUND IN YOUR BAILIWICK .. " Id. at 1072.
11. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 606.
12. See Brief for Federal Respondents at 2, Wilson (No. 98-83). When the officers
saw a child at the door, they pointed their guns away from her, asked her to come
outside, and whisked her to safety. See id. Valencia Snowden, the Wilson's
granddaughter, had been dropped off at her grandparents' house to wait for the school
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The officers then swarmed the Wilson house, conducting a "sweep" for
Dominic. 3 Charles Wilson came into the living room amid the
confusion, wearing only a pair of briefs.' 4 Encountering the unknown
men wearing street clothes and carrying guns, Charles angrily demanded
to know what was going on." Believing him to be Dominic, the officers
pinned him to the floor and restrained him. 6 Geraldine Wilson then
rushed into the living room, wearing only a sheer nightgown, to find
men with guns drawn on her husband. 7
Accompanying the deputy marshals and sheriffs that morning were
two members of the media, a reporter and a photographer from the
Washington Post.8 The reporters took numerous pictures and recorded
their observations throughout the entire encounter. 9 They did not assist
in the execution of the warrant."0 Though the warrant had authorized the
officers' involvement, the warrant made no reference to the accompanying media."'
The Wilsons filed suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland against the federal officers22 under Bivens v. Six
bus. See Brief for Petitioner at 2, Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S 603 (1999) (No. 98-83).
13. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 607. The latest address the police had for Dominic was
that of his parents' home. See id. at 606.
14. See id. at 607.
15. See id.
16. See id. "[P~rior to entering the house, the officers and media personnel [had]
reviewed an arrest worksheet and photographs of Dominic Wilson that showed him to
be 27 years old, 185 pounds, and clean-shaven.... [Charles] Wilson was 47 years old,
weighed 220 pounds and had a beard that was almost completely white." Brief for
Petitioner at 3, Wilson (No. 98-83).
17. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 607. "At no time were the Wilsons permitted to cover
themselves decently." Brief for Petitioner at 4, Wilson (No. 98-83).
18. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 607. See also Wilson, I10 F.3d at 1072 (explaining, in
the first court of appeals opinion, that the "reporters' participation was part of a twoweek, news-gathering investigation by the newspaper [and] was not designed to serve
any legitimate law enforcement purpose").
19. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 607-08. The photographs were never published. See
id.
20. See id.; Brief for Federal Respondents at 3, Wilson (No. 98-83).
21. See id. at 606; supra note 10. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(d)(1)(3) (mandating
that warrants "shall be executed ... by a marshal or some other officer authorized by
law").
22. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609. David H. Coburn, one of the Wilsons' attorneys,
explained why the Wilsons pursued a Fourth Amendment claim against the law
enforcement officials rather than a tort claim against the Washington Post. Telephone
Interview with David H. Coburn, Attorney, Steptoe & Johnson LLP, Washington, D.C.
(Oct. 22, 1999). The reporters were in the Wilson home at the invitation of officers
who had apparent authority to invite them. See id. Coburn feared, under Maryland law,
that might provide a defense to a tort action. See id. According to Coburn, the primary
parties at fault were the U.S. Marshals and the Deputy Sheriffs. See id Coburn posited
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Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics," and the state
officials24 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2" The Wilsons alleged that the
officers' actions in bringing the reporters into their home violated their
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.26 The officers moved for
27
summary judgment, asserting they were entitled to qualified immunity.
28
judgment.
The district court denied the motion for summary
The officers appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit,2 9 where a divided panel reversed the decision of the
district court."a Stressing that it was not deciding the legality of the
officers' conduct under the Fourth Amendment, the court limited its
review to the issue of qualified immunity." Because no court had held
32
prior to 1992 that media ride-alongs violate the Fourth Amendment,
the appellate panel concluded that the right asserted by the Wilsons was

it did not matter whether it was the media or a high school civics class-the officers
were in no position to invite anyone into the Wilson home not authorized by the
warrant. See id. Therefore, the Wilsons agreed to forego a tort action against the media
representatives to pursue the Fourth Amendment claims against the U.S. Marshals and
the Deputy Sheriffs. See id.
23. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Bivens. the United States Supreme Court held that a
federal common law right of action for money damages exists against federal officials
who violate an individual's constitutional rights. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397. Bivens
accomplished as a matter of federal common law what 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had long
provided for constitutional violations carried out by persons acting under the color of
state law. See infra note 25.
24. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609.
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). This statute reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
26. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 608. The Wilsons also claimed the police used
excessive force and lacked probable cause to believe Dominic would be at their home.
See Wilson, I10 F.3d at 1073.
27. See Wilson, 110 F.3d at 1073. The district court dismissed the petitioners'
complaints of excessive force and lack of probable cause, and the Supreme Court did
not address these issues. See id.
28. See id. (Messitte, J., presiding).
29. See id. at 1072.
30. See id. at 1076. Circuit Judge Wilkins wrote the majority opinion for the threemember panel, in which Justice Herlongjoined. See id. at 1072. Judge Russell wrote
a dissenting opinion. See id. at 1076 (Russell, J., dissenting).
3 1. See id. at 1075-76.
32. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 616.
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not "clearly established" at the time the officers acted and, thus, the
officers were entitled to qualified immunity. 3
A majority of the judges on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
voted to grant rehearing en banc. 34 With five judges dissenting, the en
banc court followed the district court in declining to address the Fourth
Amendment issue and holding that the officers enjoyed a qualified
immunity. 5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case and
another case raising the same issue36 to resolve a split among the circuit
courts that had since developed on the issue of whether police action in
bringing media representatives into a home during the execution of a
warrant violates the Fourth Amendment and, if so, whether the officers
in these cases were entitled to qualified immunity on the basis that such
a right was not clearly established at the time of the searches.37
I1l. BACKGROUND
Historically, the home has been afforded substantial Fourth
Amendment protection by the courts. However, today's media,
claiming its own constitutional immunity, threatens to encroach on this
private arena to serve a hungry and profitable entertainment market.
The popular media ride-along practice has not only spawned numerous
popular reality programs, it has created controversy for the courts as
well. This section highlights some of the cases, both under state tort
33. See Wilson, I10 F.3d at 1076.
34. See Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 112 (4th Cir. 1998), aff'd, 526 U.S. 603
(1999). Judge Wilkins wrote the majority opinion, in which Chief Judge Wilkinson,
and Judges Niemeyer, Luttig, and Williams joined. See id.at 11. Judge Widener
concurring). Judge Murnaghan
wrote a concurring opinion. See id. at 119 (Widener, J.,
dissenting). Judges Ervin, Hamilton, Michael,
at 119 (Murnaghan, J.,
dissented. See id.
and Moltzjoined in the dissent. See id.at I 1.
35. See Wilson, 141 F.3d at 118-19. The court introduced into its reasoning, for the
first time, several examples of how allowing media presence in the execution of a
warrant might further legitimate law enforcement purposes. See id. at 116. See also
Brief for Petitioner at 29-30, Wilson (No. 98-83) (commenting on the court's reasoning):
Under the plurality's standard, the carefully limited scope of a warrant
becomes meaningless in the face of an officer's--or a court's-post hoc
speculation that some nebulous law enforcement purpose would be served
by expanding a search beyond the warrant's scope. Such a purpose could
always be hypothesized, as the plurality's opinion illustrates.
Brief for Petitioner at 29-30, Wilson (No. 98-83). See also Reply Brief for Petitioners
at 9, Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (No. 98-83) (referring to an "ever-growing
number of post hoc rationalizations," none of which were brought up in the district
court).
36. See Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999).
37. See Wilson v. Layne, 525 U.S. 981 (1998).
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theories and under the Fourth Amendment, that have resulted when the
media accompanies public authorities into private homes.
A.

Fourth Amendment Respect for the Home

Historians generally attribute the development of the Fourth
Amendment to the abuses suffered by the colonists at the hand of the
English Crown.3 8 King James I first authorized the issuance of writs of
assistance, general warrants requiring no specific purpose, which
permitted officers to enter private property and search with unlimited
discretion for smuggled goods.39 Though English common law
resounded with the anthem of "[a] man's home is his castle ' 4° and
regarded the home as sacrosanct, 4 ' in reality, citizens could place little
reliance on these lofty ideals. 2 Even the homes of those who penned
the very declarations we quote and rely on were subject to intrusion.4 3
38. See JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19-20 (1966); NELSON B. LASSON, THE
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 13 (1937).
39. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at 22. The warrant derived its name from the
fact that the writ "charged all officers of the Crown with assisting [the customs officials
who were executing the warrant]." LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at 22. Other historians
attribute the emergence of the writ to the reign of Charles II. See LANDYNSKI. supranote
38, at 22 n.8. For a brief yet helpful discussion of this topic, see LANDYNSKI, supra note
38, at 32 n.53.
40.

See LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at 20.

41. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at 25. William Pitt proclaimed:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the
Crown. It may be frail-its roof may shake-the wind may blow through
it-the storm may enter-the rain may enter-but the King of England
cannot enter; all his force dares not cross the threshold of that ruined
tenement!
LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at 25.

42. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at 34. James Otis denounced the writ as "the
worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty and the
fundamental principles of law, that was ever found in an English law-book."
LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at 34. Originally, the writs targeted all heretical and
seditious writings and books offensive to the state. See LANDYNSKI, supranote 38, at 22.
The Court of Star Chamber, ajudicial tribunal made powerful under Elizabeth, ensured
the suppression of seditious printing. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at 21-22. The Star
Chamber conferred unlimited power to the Stationers' Company, a private guild
organization, to enforce the writs and seize and destroy all contraband materials,
including the presses they were printed on. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at 21. In
return, the Stationers' Company received monopolistic privileges to print official state
materials. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at 2 1. See also LASSON, supra note 38, at 23-

27, for a more detailed discussion of the Star Chamber.
43. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at 23. Even Lord Coke, who wrote the opinions
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The authors ofthe Constitution responded to the arbitrary invasions
of their homes by including the Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights,
requiring that warrants be based on probable cause and that the places
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized, be particularly
described." The framers sought to provide enforceable safeguards that
would uphold the protection of their homes espoused by common-law
doctrine.4 5 Since then, the Supreme Court has labored to determine what
constitutes a reasonable search under the terms of the Fourth Amendment. 6 While recent decisions have seemingly chipped away at what
some regard as Fourth Amendment rights,4 7 the Court has steadfastly
resolved to leave the integrity of the home intact.4 8 Evident of the
deference given to the home, the Court has consistently required a high
degree ofjustification to warrant the intrusive search of a home. 9
of the court, was subject to the officious searches. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at 23.
As he lay dying, officers ransacked his study and library, appropriating his manuscripts
and works. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at 23. See also Michael N. Levy, Comment,
The Price of Fame: Should Law Enforcement Officers Who Permit CameraCrews to Film the
Execution of a Warrant in a Private Home Be Held Liablefor Civil Damages?, 92 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1153, 1162 n.69 (1998) (crediting Lord Coke with the English maxim, "a man's
home is his castle").
44. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Id. Indicative of the colonists' desire to avoid recurrences of past abuses, "six of the
newly independent American states almost immediately wrote into their own
constitutions provisions akin to those of the Fourth Amendment." LANDYNSKI, supra
note 38, at 20.
45. See LANDYNSKI, supra note 38, at 20.
46. See Bond, supra note I, at 836. "The Warren Court ushered in a general
expansion of Fourth Amendment protections. This expansion, however, was followed
by a period of retrenchment initiated by the Burger Court and carried on during Chief
Justice Rehnquist's tenure." Bond, supra note 1, at 836. Furthermore, Bond claims the
Court's treatment of the "reasonableness" test it employs has "undercut the right to
privacy and give[n] rise to a shifting and confusing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence."
Bond, supra note 1, at 837.
47. See Nadine Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Balance: Accurately Setting the
Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1174
(1988). Strossen asserts that recent Supreme Court decisions have "steadily reduced
the scope of the privacy and liberty rights that the [F]ourth [A]mendment protects." Id
48. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585, 589-90 (1980). The Court opined
that "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the
Fourth Amendment is directed." Id. at 585.
49. See Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 767 (1985). The Court stressed that "the
Fourth Amendment's command that searches be 'reasonable' requires that when the
State seeks to intrude upon an area in which our society recognizes a significantly
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Media Intrusions into the Home
1.

The Controversy

A new genre of television shows" emerged in the 1980s with the
advent of the camcorder.5
Beginning with shows like America's
FunniestHome Videos, where contestants vied for weekly cash prizes for
funny or embarrassing moments caught on videotape,52 the American
public was soon captivated by programming where even the most
intimate details of other people's lives were subject to public scrutiny.53
The term "reality television" was coined to describe these new shows
where the viewing audience could watch such activities as police
making arrests in citizen's homes, highway patrolmen in high-speed
chases, and emergency rescue teams in action."
Scholars and reporters alike have shared concern regarding the
American public's thirst for voyeurism and voyeuristic television.5
After the reality television shows proved successful, more shocking
programs soon followed, such as the trash talk shows like Jenny Jones
and Jerry Springer, where people exposed their secrets and bared their
souls to millions of viewers who craved this new form of
entertainment." Tabloid news shows appeared, engaging in sensational
heightened privacy interest, a more substantial justification is required to make the
search 'reasonable."' Id.
50. See supra note 2 for a description of these shows.
5 1. See McClurg, supra note 2, at 1021 & n. 177.
52. See Clay Calvert, The Voyeurism Value in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 17
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 273, 275 n. 13 (1999). America's Funniest Home Videos
debuted in November 1989; by February 1990, it captured the first place slot in the
national television ratings. See id.
53. See Valerie Milano, Syndication Gets Real, VIDEO AGE INT'L, Jan. I, 1999, at 30.
Since the February 1997 debut of World's ScariestPolice Chases on the Fox network, Fox
has cornered the reality TV market. See id. Fox's successes include Cops, Cops 2, When
Animals Attack, When Disasters Strike, When Stunts Go Bad, World's Scariest Police
Shootouts, and World's Scariest Police Chases, combining for an overwhelming viewing
audience of over 37 million. See id.
54. See McClurg, supra note 2, at 1013-14. Professor McClurg asserts "the goal
of these programs is to compress as much human suffering and failing as possible into
the allotted thirty- or sixty-minute time slot." McClurg, supra note 2, at 1013.
55. See Calvert, supra note 52, at 274 & n.9. While the word voyeurism usually
carries with it a sexual connotation, Professor Calvert uses the term in the more generic
sense of the "urge to gaze at the alien and the intimate." Calvert, supra note 52, at 274
& n.9. Nightline host Ted Koppel warned graduates in his 1998 commencement address
at Stanford University that, "America was becoming a nation of electronic voyeurs
whose capacity for dialogue is a fading memory." Calvert, supra note 52, at 275 n. 13.
56. See Calvert, supra note 52, at 277. Professor Calvert claims these shows "often
are about little more than watching others' lives unfold-frequently, in fact, unraveling
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ist broadcasting." Even traditional local news broadcasts have been
accused of blurring the lines between news and entertainment." Critics
feel the networks have responded with a simple supply and demand
analysis; the public demands this form of voyeuristic entertainment and,
for as long as it remains profitable, the networks supply the programming."
2.

The FirstAmendment Balance

The First Amendment expressly guarantees the right of a free
press.6' However, whereas the founding fathers advocated a free press
as a means of political thought and reform,6' commentators suggest that
vision has been distorted to accommodate even the most intrusive acts
in furtherance of the public's "right to know.'" 2 The question arises,
then, as to how far the law will go in protecting the rights of the media
to satisfy the public's demand for invasive, voyeuristic entertainment.
The Supreme Court ruled, two decades ago, that the First Amendment
does not create for the press a greater right of access to information than
that accorded to the general public.6 3 However, the Court has also
determined that newsgathering is not without First Amendment
protection.64
in front of our eyes." Calvert, supra note 52, at 277.
57. See Calvert, supra note 52, at 277 & n.19. Inside Edition won six journalism
awards for investigative reporting in the 1996-97 season alone. See Calvert, supra note
52, at 277 & n. 19.
58. See Calvert, supra note 52, at 286.
59. See McClurg, supra note 2, at 1017. Professor McClurg places the
responsibility for this boon on willing American consumers. See McClurg, supra note
2, at 1017. See also Quentin Burrows, Scowl Because You 're on CandidCamera: Privacy
and Video Surveillance, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 1079, 1108-09 (1997) (applying a supply and
demand analysis).
60. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing, in relevant part, that "Congress shall
make no law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press").
61. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
"The
constitutional safeguard . . . 'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."' Id.
(quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
62. See Gary Williams, The Right of Privacy Versus the Right to Know: The War
Continues, 19 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 215, 215 (1999).
63. See Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (holding that the First
Amendment does not create for the press a right of access to information "different
from or greater than that accorded the public generally").
64. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972). See also Larissa Barnett
Lidsky, Prying, Spying, and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do
About It, 73 TUL. L. REV. 173, 186 (1998) (naming Branzburg a "pivotal case" in
newsgathering). Professor Lidsky explains that Branzburg was not really about
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While the media possesses a constitutional right to gather news, the
Court has held that the right is subordinate to the laws that govern all
citizens, 65 even if these laws cause the media to experience a greater
burden in its newsgathering.' In fact, some scholars assert that the lack
of judicial sympathy that existed towards media ride-alongs, in
67
particular, has been converted into overt hostility.
3.

Home Invasions by the Media Accompanying Public Authorities
a.

Cases based on the tort of intrusion

Plaintiffs in cases against the press have increasingly challenged the
media's pre-publication newsgathering conduct under a variety of state
tort theories. 6 The recent media ride-along cases have focused
primarily upon claims for trespass and invasion of privacy.69
Though considered by many to be a fundamental right, the
Constitution makes no reference to a right of privacy.70 The first legal
newsgathering methods. See id. According to Lidsky, Branzburg was a "reporter's
privilege" case, in that the Court held the First Amendment does not protect
subpoenaed reporters from withholding information obtained from confidential sources
when called before a criminal grand jury. See id. Branzburg is nonetheless important
for newsgathering, Lidsky stresses, because the remainder of the Court's opinion seems
to indicate that while a constitutional right to gather news may exist, that right is going
to be seen as "quite limited in scope." See id.
65. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684. "[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee
the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the
public generally." Id. See also Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir.
1971). In Dietemann, the court observed, "[Tihe First Amendment has never been
construed to accord newsmen immunity from torts or crimes committed during the
course of newsgathering. The First Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or
to intrude by electronic means into the precincts of another's home or office." Id.
66. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 682. The court postulated that generally applicable
laws do not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against the
press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news. See id. See also
Lidsky, supra note 64, at 187 (simplifying the court's holding to "[i]f the general public
has a right to use particular methods to gather news, so does the press; if the public
does not, then neither does the press.").
67. See Victor A. Kovner et al., Recent Development in Newsgathering. Invasion of
Privacy and Related Torts, 540 PRAC. L. INST. 445, 456 (1998).
68. See id. at 451.
69. See Eve Klindera, Note, Qualified Immunityfor Cops (and Other Public Officials)
with Cameras: Let Common Law Remedies Ensure Press Responsibility, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 399,416 (1999).
70. See ELLEN ALDERMAN & CAROLINE KENNEDY, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY i. The
authors gave expression to the inherent belief passed down by our ancestors that if a
man's home is, indeed, his castle, it stands to reason "that man is king of that domain
and, by extension, the whole of his private life." Id.
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recognition of a right to privacy came under tort law when Samuel D.
Warren and Louis D. Brandeis penned their seminal article in 1890
calling on courts to provide a tort remedy for invasions of what they
described as the "right to be let alone."'" Written during a period of
"yellow journalism,""' Warren and Brandeis were concerned that new
technological inventions of the time posed a threat to individual
privacy."
Over halfa century later, Dean William Prosser, in his own famous
law review article on the subject,74 surveyed the cases recognizing tort
claims for invasion of privacy and asserted that "invasion of privacy"
actually constitutes four distinct torts: intrusion, public disclosure of
private facts, false light, and appropriation." Of the four, many agree
that intrusion provides the most likely remedy for plaintiffs whose
privacy has been invaded by intrusive newsgathering.76 Intrusion is
aimed specifically at protecting one's sphere of privacy, whether
physical or psychological, and covers a wide array of newsgathering
techniques now employed."' In addition, intrusion does not require
71. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193 (1890). The authors have often been quoted for their remarkable
declaration: "The common law has always recognized a man's house as his castle,
impregnable, often, even to its own officers engaged in the execution of its commands.
Shall the courts thus close the front entrance to constituted authority, and open wide the
back door to idle or prurient curiosity?" Id.at 220.
72. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1616 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "yellow
journalism" as "a type of journalism which distorts and exploits the news by
sensationalism in order to sell copies of the newspapers or magazines").
73. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 71, at 195. The authors spoke almost
prophetically of today's voyeuristic thirsts when they wrote, "Instantaneous
photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and
domestic life; and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction
that 'what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops."' Warren
& Brandeis, supra note 7 1, at 195. See also Burrows, supra note 59, at 1085 (listing the
camera, the printing press, tabloid papers, and the telephone as new technological
inventions at that time). See also Williams, supra note 62, at 216 (suggesting that today
the battle for privacy is "being waged along new technological and sociological
fronts"). In support, Professor Williams claims "Itihe explosion ofreality programming
with its insatiable appetite for visual and aural images of exciting, bizarre, and tragic
human occurrences threaten[s] to intrude on the privacy of ordinary citizens [in an
unprecedented way]." Williams, supra note 62, at 217.
74. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
75. See id. at 389. See also Lidsky, supra note 64, at 204 n.159 (noting that Dean
Prosser's work has been pivotal to the development of the law of privacy and
instrumental in the drafting of the Restatement (Second) of Torts).
76. See Lidsky, supra note 64, at 203; Elsa Y. Ransom, No Place for "Law
Enforcement Theatricals "-The Outlawing of Police/Media Home Invasions in Ayeni v.
Mottola, 16 LoY. L.A. ENT. 325, 345 (1995).

77. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS § 652B (1977), which reads: "[Olne who
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publication as an element of the tort.7"
Because it focuses on
newsgathering behavior rather than publication, intrusion is able to
overcome otherwise insurmountable First Amendment concerns.7 9
Prosser's definitions of the four invasion of privacy torts were
embraced by the Restatement (Second) of Torts and have been generally
recognized by the courts."0
However, because the construction,
interpretation, and application of tort law is within each individual
state's discretion, inconsistent decisions have arisen, and the issue has
been left in an overall state of confusion.8'
Perhaps the most prominent case recognizing a tort claim for
intrusion arising from media intrusions into the home is Miller v.
NationalBroadcastingCo. 2 When Dave Miller collapsed one evening in
his Los Angeles home, a neighbor called 911 and soon paramedics, with
a news crew in tow, were working to revive Miller. 3 Dave Miller's
wife, Brownie, was standing in the hallway and did not even notice the
news crew in the confusion of the moment. 4 Three weeks later, she was
horrified as N BC began repeatedly broadcasting the video footage ofthe
paramedics' unsuccessful attempts to save her husband's life. 5 Brownie
Miller and her daughter brought suit against the television station and
the producer for invasion of privacy. 6
. The media representatives defended their actions by claiming the
focus of the story was on the paramedics and that the victims were only
incidental.8 7 They argued that entries into other homes presented no
problems and conveyed an attitude that had Mrs. Miller wanted them
intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another
or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." Id."[Tihe
tort's initial purpose... was to fill in the gaps left by trespass, nuisance, the intentional
infliction of mental distress, and whatever remedies there may be for the invasion of
constitutional rights." Lidsky, supra note 64, at 205.
78. See REsTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTORTS, supra note 77, § 652B cmt. b.
79. See Lidsky, supra note 64, at 204.
80. See McClurg, supra note 2, at 998 & n.41 (citing cases from 28 states adopting
all four torts).
81. See ALDERMAN & KENNEDY, supra note 70, at 156.
82. 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
83. See Miller, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 674. The television crew, led by producer Ruben
Norte, had been riding with the paramedics in preparation for a report on emergency
medical services in the Los Angeles area. See id.at 673.
84. See id at 674.
85. See id.
86. See id.at 670.
87. See id.
at 673. Norte stated that his intent was "to film and document whatever
[the paramedics'] work was and whatever it happened to be when we filmed." Id.
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out, she could have asked them to leave." The trial court accepted this
viewpoint and dismissed the claims against the media. 9
The California Court of Appeals, however, took a dim view of the
media actions. Concentrating on whether the media's actions were
highly offensive to a reasonable person, the court declared that the crew
had clearly intruded into Brownie Miller's private space as she
witnessed her husband's dying moments.9" The fact that neither
Brownie Miller nor the other referenced residents objected to the media
presence only proved to the court the confusion that existed pertaining
to this area of the law. 91
An earlier New York case, Anderson v. WROC-TV, 92 recognized a
claim for trespass when a county humane society investigator invited
three television stations to accompany him into a private home to
witness the execution of a search warrant. 93 The television stations
unsuccessfully raised a defense that entry was impliedly authorized by
custom and practice.94 Recalling William Pitt's famous oratory
regarding the sanctity of the home, the court declined to recognize an
implied consent defense, whether created by law or custom, that would
give a television station a license to enter a place where even the
sovereign could not.95
88. See Miller, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 673 (testifying that he had entered approximately
10 to 15 private residences without consent and, of the half of those who inquired about
his business, none had objected to his presence).
89. See id.at 672.
90. See id.at 679. The court, disturbed by the media attitude and actions in this
case, reasoned that "reasonable people could construe the lack of restraint and
sensitivity NBC producer Norte and his crew displayed as a cavalier disregard for
ordinary citizens' rights of privacy, or, as an indication that they considered such rights
of no particular importance." Id.
91. See id. at 682. The court claimed that such behavior "illustrates, perhaps, a
widespread loss of certainty about where public concerns end and private life begins,
and a loss of personal identity manifested by individual members of the public when
confronted by aggressive media representatives." Id.In an eloquent summation of the
tort of intrusion, the court continued, "Personal security in a society saturated daily
with publicity about its members requires protection not only from governmental
intrusion, but some basic bulwark of defense against private commercial enterprises
which derive profits from gathering and disseminating information." Id.
92. 441 N.Y.S.2d 220 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
93. See Anderson, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 222. The warrant authorized the investigator to
seize any animals "found to be in a confined, crowded or unhealthy condition or in
unhealthy or unsanitary surroundings or . . . not properly cared for or without
sustenance, food and drink." Id.
94. See id. at 223.
95. See id. at 226. The court opined that "[i]f the news media were to succeed in
compelling an uninvited and non-permitted entry into one's private home whenever it
chose to do so, this would be nothing less than a general warrant, equivalent to the writs
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However, an Ohio court recently granted summary judgment to
media defendants confronted with tort claims in Reeves v. Fox Television
Network.9 6 Police officers asked Willie Reeves if they could enter his
home prior to arresting him.97 A television crew from the show Cops
entered along with the police, videotaped, and later broadcast the
encounter and arrest.9" Reeves sued Fox for invasion of privacy by
intrusion and for trespass."
The court accepted the media's defense that Reeves had consented
to the media entry into his home."° Because Reeves opened the door to
the police, acknowledged the presence of the crew, and did not ask the
cameraman to leave, the court concluded that consent had been given.' 0
Finding no facts that indicated an intrusion or trespass had occurred, the
court granted summary judgment in favor of the media.' 2
In Magenis v. FisherBroadcasting,'3 a television crew accompanied
a police raid into a home on a search warrant for stolen vehicles and
narcotics."° The Oregon Court of Appeals declined to rescind ajury
instruction that demanded a high degree of offensiveness for thejury to
find an intrusion had occurred." 5 Though clearly on the Magenis
property without permission, the court held that fact insufficient for an
invasion of privacy claim."° Interpreting the requirement of section
652B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts that the intrusion be highly
offensive to a reasonable person, the court concluded that thejury might
find other factors, beyond merely entering the Magenis property,
relevant in deciding whether the intrusion met that standard.0 7
of assistance which were so odious to the American colonists." Id.
96. 983 F. Supp. 703 (N.D. Ohio 1997).
97. See Reeves, 983 F. Supp. at 707.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 712.
101. See id. at 712-13. The court considered it a "novel position" advanced by
Reeves that "unless a homeowner gives specific oral consent to each person in a group
of people that enter his home... every person after the first person to enter the home
is a trespasser or intruder despite the fact that the homeowner opened his door and
admitted them; was aware of their presence; and did not object." Id. See also Baugh
v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (stating that California law holds
consent to be an absolute defense to intrusion, whether or not fraudulently induced).
102. See Reeves, 983 F. Supp. at 714.
103. 798 P.2d 1106 (Or. Ct. App. 1990).
104. See Magenis, 798 P.2d at 1107-08.
105. See id. at 110.
106. See id.
107. See id. (claiming "the extent of the intrusion, the context, conduct and
circumstances surrounding the intrusion, the defendant's motives, the setting into which
defendant intruded and the plaintiff's expectation of privacy" might also be considered
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According to the court, trespass was only one factor to be considered in
finding the conduct "highly offensive."'0 8
The difficulty in bringing tort cases against the media, as illustrated
by the above cases, is that what is regarded as "highly offensive"
seemingly varies from state to state, rendering inconsistent decisions on
like causes of action.
b.

Fourth Amendment cases against government officials

The chief aim of the Fourth Amendment is to protect individuals
from arbitrary government intrusion."° When law enforcement officers
invite the media into a private home during the execution of a warrant,
the constitutional rights to privacy arising under the Fourth Amendment
are thus challenged."0 However, prior to the 1992 events of Wilson, no
judicial opinion had held that media ride-alongs into the home were a
violation of the Fourth Amendment."' In fact, the sole reported
decision at that time dealing with the issue found the conduct not
unreasonable, though the court did not engage in a Fourth Amendment
analysis to reach its conclusion." 2
Before Wilson reached the United States Supreme Court, a series of
cases focusing on the constitutional issue came before the district and
appellate courts." 3 One of the more well-known cases, Ayeni v.
Mottola,"4 arose after a Secret Service agent allowed a CBS crew into a
home to videotape the execution of a warrant." 5 The agents had reason
by the jury).
108. See id.
109. See Henry H. Rossbacher & Tracy W. Young, Law Enforcement Theatricals:
Privacy in Peril, PRAC. L. INST., June-July 1998, at 54. Rossbacher served as co-counsel
in both the Ayeni and Berger cases. See infra notes 114-127 and 138-149 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
110. See Rossbacher, supra note 109, at 54.
111. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 616.
112. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 616, 622 n.3 (Stevens, J.,concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768, 780 (Wis. Ct. App.
1980)). In Prahl, the court held that it would not imply consent as a matter of law for
media representatives entering another's property for a newsworthy event without the
owners' consent. See id.at 622 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). The case did not, however, embark on a detailed constitutional analysis. See id.
at 616. The Court also referred to Moncriefv. Hanton, 10 Media L. Rptr. 1620 (N.D.
Ohio 1984), and Higbee v. Times-Advocate, 5 Media L. Rptr. 2372 (S.D. Cal. 1980),
unpublished decisions upholding the reasonableness of a search on "unorthodox nonFourth Amendment right to privacy theories." Id.
113. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 618.
114. 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994).
115. See Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 683. The producer of the weekly news program Street
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to believe Babatunde Ayeni was involved with credit card fraud. ' 6
Although Ayeni was not home at the time of the raid, the news crew
proceeded to film the Secret Service interrogation of his wife over her
objections and while her young son stood behind her crying." 7 Personal
effects were searched and recorded on film, all while the agent narrated
the details of the alleged credit card fraud." '
On interlocutory appeal, the United States District Court for the
Second Circuit affirmed the trial court's findings that Agent Mottola had
violated the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable
search and seizxures." 9 Recognizing the high degree of privacy
afforded the home,'2 ° the court reiterated the long-standing principle
that, when entry into a home is authorized by a warrant, the officers are
limited to the express terms of the warrant or to actions that reasonably
relate to the objectives of the warrant or other legitimate law enforcement purposes.' 2 ' The court concluded that Motolla exceeded these
"well-established [constitutional] principles" by bringing third parties
into the Ayeni home who were neither authorized by the warrant nor
serving a legitimate law enforcement purpose there.'22 Furthermore, the
court denounced Motolla's actions as exploitative of the very privacy
23
value the Fourth Amendment sought to protect.'
The court noted that there were no reported decisions expressly
forbidding agents from inviting the press into the home of one being
Stories led the news crew. See id. at 683 n. 1.
116. See Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 683.
117. See id. Mrs. Ayeni, dressed only in a nightgown, tried to avoid the camera by
shielding her face with a magazine. See id. When she attempted to cover her son's face
with a magazine, Agent Mottolo grabbed the magazine from her hand, threw it on the
floor, and told Mrs. Ayeni and her son to "shut up." See id The agent then directed the
cameraman to aim directly at Mrs. Ayeni's face while he interrogated her. See id
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 685. The court asserted, "The home has properly been regarded as
among the most highly protected zones of privacy... afford[ing] the most stringent
Fourth Amendment protection." Id.
121. See id. at 685 & n.6 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed.
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)). The court noted that "[i]t has long been
established that the objectives of the Fourth Amendment are to preserve the right of
privacy to the maximum extent consistent with [the] reasonable exercise of law
enforcement duties." Id. at 686. When warrants are necessary, the court requires that
a law enforcement officer's invasion of the privacy of the home be restricted to either
the express terms of the warrant or reasonable actions related to the execution of the
warrant. See id.
122. See Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 686.
123. See id. The court directed this scathing remark to the defendants: "A private
home is not a soundstage for law enforcement theatricals." Id.
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searched when the Secret Service allowed the media to invade the Ayeni
home.124 However, despite the absence of a case on point, the court held
that no officer could have found such conduct to be reasonable. 25 A
26
federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3105, guided the court in its decision.
Because CBS did not assist the officers, but the officers did assist CBS
in procuring video materials, the
Second Circuit found the search to be
12
1
unreasonable.
constitutionally
Two years later, the United States District Court for the Eighth
Circuit reviewed an alleged violation of Fourth Amendment rights in
Parker v. Boyer. 121 Police invited reporters into a home to record a
weapons investigation of suspect Travis Martin; 129 the reporters planned
to use the video as part of a news story concentrating on police efforts
to eradicate illegal weapons. 3 Gaining entry through an unlocked front
door, the police proceeded to execute the warrant and found two
weapons, along with a substance
thought to be cocaine, while the news
3
crew filmed the search.1 '
The appellate court reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment against the officers on grounds of qualified immunity, and
32
affirmed the district court'sjudgment in favor ofthe television station.
Finding no case on point, and receiving no specific guidance from the
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 687; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994). The statute provides:
A search warrant may in all cases be served by any of the officers mentioned
in its direction or by an officer authorized by law to serve such warrant, but
by no other person, except in aid of the officer on his requiring it, he being
present and acting in its execution.
18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994). See also Ransom, supra note 76, at 335 (explaining that the
court recognized that the statute was not controlling authority on the scope of the
Fourth Amendment).
127. See Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 688.
128. 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996).
129. See Parker, 93 F.3d at 446-47.
130. See id. at 446. See also Christopher A. Rothe, Note. The Legal Future of
"'Reality""Cop Shows: Parker v. Boyer Dismisses , 1983 Claims Against Police Officers and

Television Stations Jointly Engaged in Searches of Homes, 5 VILL. SPORTS &

ENT.

L.J. 48 1,

485 (1998) (noting that Martin resided at the home of Sandra Parker and her sixteenyear-old daughter).
131. See Parker, 93 F.3d at 447. KSDK subsequently broadcast the tapes of the
search of the Parker's residence-showing the teenage daughter, wearing only a
nightgown and being held at gunpoint-on several of its news programs. See Bond,
supra note 1, at 828. The weapons turned out to be legally registered, the substances
were never analyzed, and criminal charges were never filed. See Bond, supra note I,
at 828. The Parkers subsequently brought suit against both the police officers and the
media who entered their home. See Parker, 93 F.3d at 446.
132. See Parker, 93 F.3d at 446.
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Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit claimed it was not "self-evident" that
the police were violating any Fourth Amendment rights by allowing the
media to enter a private residence during the execution of a warrant.'33
Since Ayeni was decided after the events in Parkertranspired, the court
viewed the Second Circuit decision as, at most, only the beginning of a
trend in the law and not law that was clearly established.'3 4
In a concurring opinion, Judge Rosenbaum criticized the analysis
of the court, insisting that the first step in a qualified immunity analysis,
that of first determining the existence of a constitutional right, had been
overlooked.'3 ' Consistent with Ayeni, Judge Rosenbaum concluded that
police officers executing a warrant violate a resident's Fourth Amendment rights when they allow the media to enter a private citizen's home
without consent of the resident.'36 Writing separately, Judge Richard
Arnold stated that he, too, would find constitutional rights had been
violated because of the joint police and media action."'
In yet another decision, Berger v. Hanlon,3 ' the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned a district court's findings
and concluded that federal agents who permitted the media to accompany them when they executed a search warrant on a ranch violated the
Fourth Amendment.'39 Former employees of Mr. Berger had told
United States Fish and Wildlife Service agents that they had seen Berger
previously shooting or poisoning eagles. 4 ° Hearing of a possible
investigation, representatives from Cable News Network (CNN) and
Turner Broadcasting System (TBS) approached the federal agents for
permission to film the discovery of any evidence the agents might
find.'4 ' The parties entered into a contract; 42 however, agents failed to

133. See id. at 447.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 448 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring).
136. See id. (Rosenbaum, J., concurring).
137. See id. at 448-49 (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
According to Judge Arnold, the news crew came with the police and entered with the
police. See id. at 449. "They did not simply happen along the street at the time that a
search was being conducted." Id.
138. 129 F.3d 505 (9th Cir. 1997).
139. See Berger, 129 F.3d at 507-08.
140. See id. at 508. The Bergers, an elderly couple, lived on and operated a 75,000acre ranch in Montana. See id.
14 1. See id. at 508. CNN and TBS wanted video footage of the search for broadcast
on their environmental television shows Earth Matters and Network Earth. See id. at 507.
142. See id. at 507-08.
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disclose this fact when seeking a search warrant from the magistrate
143
judge.
A convoy often vehicles containing agents and film crews entered
the Berger property. 44 One of the agents wore a concealed wire that
transmitted his conversations with Berger to the media, even those made
inside the Berger residence 45 The media later broadcast both video
footage and the sound recordings made from within the home."
In an opinion reminiscent of Ayeni, the court found the agents and
media, acting together, had infringed on the Berger's expectation of
privacy when they illicitly recorded the conversations within the
home. 47 The court cited a Fourth Circuit decision where officers
violated the Fourth Amendment by bringing along an employee of a
private corporation on a search warrant, when that employee was acting
for the corporation's purposes and not in aid of the officers.'48 To the
Ninth Circuit, the joint effort between the officers and the media
presented a search that was conducted for purposes other than that of
49
law enforcement.

In examining the cases that have arisen regarding the constitutional
right to privacy, an important point to note from Justice Stevens's
dissent in the Wilson case is that each of these decisions agreed on the
merits of the constitutional issue.
According to Justice Stevens, the
143. See id.
at 508-09. Apparently, the magistratejudge "[possessed] no knowledge
of the planned media participation in the search... [nor did he authorize] videotaping
of the search for broadcast purposes." Id.
144. See id. at 509.
145. See Berger, 129 F.3d at 509. United States Fish and Wildlife Service Special
Agent Joel Scrafford was wired with a hidden microphone that fed live audio to the
CNN crew located in the van. See id. Neither Agent Scrafford nor anyone else
informed the Bergers of the microphone or that any visible cameras belonged to the
media. See id.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 511-12 (citing Wilson, I10 F.3d 1071 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussed supra
in notes 8-37 and accompanying text); Parker, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996) (discussed
supra in notes 128-137 accompanying text); and Stack v. Killian, 96 F.3d 159 (6th Cir.
1996) (allowing a search to stand where the warrant expressly authorized photography
and videotaping)). The court contrasted the conduct of the agents and media in those
cases with the present actions (and made this stinging comment): "In none of these
cases did law enforcement officials engage in conduct approaching the planning,
cooperation and assistance to the media that occurred in this case." Id. at 512.
148. See id. at 511. The historical foundations of the Fourth Amendment proved to
the court that "[t]he right to be free from government officials facilitating a private
person's general search was 'manifestly included' within the 'core' Fourth Amendment
protection." Id.(quoting Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347, 357 (4th Cir. 1995)).
149. Seeid. atSlO.
150. See Wilson, 526 U.S at 619 n.I (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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split that existed between the circuits dealt solely with the issue of
qualified immunity.1'

C.

Qualified Immunity
1.

Backgroundand Development

If a search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment, an officer
sued for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens may still find relief
by way of qualified immunity."3 2 Wood v. Strickland'3 first set the
standard in determining when a plaintiff could claim a defense of
qualified immunity.' 54 In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court
set forth a subjective test that focused on whether the official acted in
good faith. " Seven years later, the Court changed its position in Harlow
v. Fitzgerald,56 replacing the subjective inquiry with an objective test.5 7
Under Harlow, an officer must show that the rights claimed by the
plaintiffs were not "clearly established" at the time of the action, or that
it was "objectively reasonable" for the agent to believe that the acts did
not violate "clearly established" guidelines."'5 Later, the Court added an
additional requirement to the qualified immunity test in Anderson v.
Creighton.'59 The Court mandated that the right a government official is
15 1. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
152.

See SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION: THE LAW

OFSECTION 1983 § 8.1, at 8-4 (4th ed. 1999). Section 1983 contains no provision for
defenses or immunities, but Supreme Court decisions have extended this protection to
certain entities. See id. at 8-4. See also, e.g., Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555
(1978) (prison officials); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (mental hospital
administrators); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (school board members);
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974) (executive officials); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547 (1967) (police officers).
153. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
154. See id.
155. See id. at 321. The Court claimed that the appropriate standard in a qualified
immunity analysis contained elements of both objective and subjective good faith. See
id.
156. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). See also Bond, supra note 1, at 846 (positing that the
doctrine ofqualified immunity set forth in Harlow "seeks to promote more effective and
decisive state action by relieving public officials who perform discretionary duties from
the fear of civil liability").
157. See Bond, supra note I, at 844.
158. See Harlow. 457 U.S. at 818. See also Bond, supra note 1, at 845 (stressing that
the Court is not reformulating a subjective analysis, even when determining the
objective legal reasonableness of an action requires inquiry into the information
possessed by the officers in question).
159. 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
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alleged to have violated must be established with a degree of specificity
so that60a reasonable officer would understand that his actions violate that
right.
2.

Split in the Circuits

The Second and Ninth Circuits held in Ayeni and Berger, respectively, that the officers involved were not protected under a qualified
immunity defense.' 6 ' Both courts seemed to look to general, abstract
principles established by the Fourth Amendment to guide their
decisions.' 62 The defendant officers did, however, receive protection
under the qualified immunity defense from the Fourth and Eighth
Circuits in Wilson and Parker.'63 To those circuits, the law was uncertain, presenting no clearly established guidelines for officers to
follow.'" Such was the state of law when Wilson came before the
Supreme Court.

160. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (explaining that the right must be established in
a "particular sense," such that a reasonable officer would be aware that his actions
violated that right). See also Casey Tourtillot, Note, Wilson v. Layne: The Growing
Relationship Between Law Enforcement and the Media: Should It Extend into Private Homes?,
67 UMKC L. REV. 445, 449 (1998) (explaining that the right allegedly violated must
be defined at a level neither too general nor too specific). "If the Court defines the right
at the highest level of abstraction--e.g., the right to be free from violations of the
Constitution-then every right is clearly established; all officers should know that they
cannot violate the Constitution." Id. If, on the other hand, a right is defined too
narrowly, requiring specific fact patterns, Tourtillot claims the right could never be
considered clearly established. See id.
161. See Ayeni, 35 F.3d at 686; Berger, 129 F.3d at 511.
162. See supra notes 119-24, 147-48 and accompanying text.
163. See Wilson, 141 F.3d at 119; Parker, 93 F.3d at 447.
164. See Wilson, 141 F.3dat 117. Referring to the split in circuit court decisions, the
Wilson court reasoned that, "given that reasonable jurists can differ on this question, we
cannot say that the law was so clear that a reasonable officer must have known his
actions transgressed constitutional bounds." Id. Likewise, the Parker court could not
say the kind of conduct the police engaged in was a violation of clearly established
constitutional principles of which the officers should have known. See Parker, 93 F.3d
at 447. Even given two cases decided after the events of this case, the court saw them
only, at most, as an indication of the beginnings of a trend in the law and not clearly
established guidelines. See id.

700

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

IV. REASONING
In Wilson v. Layne,'65 the United States Supreme Court held that
police bringing members of the media or other third parties into a home
during the execution of a warrant is a violation of the Fourth Amendment when those third parties are not present to aid in the execution of
the warrant." 6 The Court further held, however, that the officers were
entitled to qualified immunity because such a right was not clearly
established in 1992 at the time the officers undertook the searches.'67
A.

Majority Opinion
I.

FourthAnendmnent Violation

The Court commenced its Fourth Amendment analysis with a
famous observation made by an English court almost four centuries ago
that "the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well
68
for his defence [sic] against injury and violence, as for his repose."'
This respect for the home led William Blackstone to comment, "the law
of England has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a
man's house, that it stiles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be
violated with impunity.' ' 69 The Court noted how this principle
regarding the sanctity of the home had become so established in the
minds of our forefathers as to make its way into the text of the Fourth
Amendment. 7 ° The Court further observed that it was this respect for
the home, embedded in historical traditions and embodied in our
constitutional framework, that had led the Court in prior decisions to
deny police entry into the home absent a warrant or exigent circumstances. '71
165. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
166. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority
opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Parts I and II, and the opinion of the
Court with respect to Part Ill, in which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter,
Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyerjoined. See id. at 605. Justice Stevens wrote an opinion
concurring in Parts I and I and dissenting in Part III. See id. at 618 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
167. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 606.
168. See id. at 609-10 (quoting Semayne's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (1604)).
169. See id. at 610 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND *223 (1765-69)).
170. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
171. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 610-11. In support of this belief, the Court cited to
Pavton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), which held that, absent a warrant or exigent
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The Court did not deny that the officers in this case had due
authority to enter the Wilson home to execute the warrant. 72 That
authority did not extend, however, to allowing the media representatives
to enter the home with them, according to the Court. 73 Recalling earlier
decisions, the Court explained that a search becomes unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment if the scope of the search exceeds the
terms of a validly issued warrant.' 74 The Fourth Amendment mandates
that any activity conducted in the execution of a warrant must properly
7
relate to the objectives of the authorized intrusion. 1
The Court expressed its concern that the media presence in this case
bore any relation to the objectives of the lawful warrant.
Because the
officers admitted that the reporters were not present for the purpose of
aiding the officers in the execution of the warrant,'" the media presence
was not related to the objective of the warrant, i.e., the apprehension of
Dominic Wilson.17 The Court contrasted this case with cases where the
presence of third parties is necessary to the execution of a warrant, as,
for example, to identify stolen goods. The media in this case served
no such purpose.80
In concluding its constitutional analysis, the Court discounted
several arguments advanced by the marshals and deputy sheriffs that the
presence of the media in the Wilson home served legitimate law
enforcement purposes.'8 ' First, the officers argued that to further law
enforcement missions, officers should be given reasonable discretion in
allowing media ride-alongs when executing warrants. 8 2 While the
circumstances, police could not enter a home to make an arrest. See id. at 611.
172.

See Wilson, 526 U.S. at611.

173. See id.
174. See id. (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990)).
175. See id. (citing Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987)). See also Maryland
v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987) (stating that "the purposes justifying a police search
strictly limit the permissible extent of the search").
176. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 611.

177. See Brief of Respondents Mark A. Collins, Eric E. Runion, and Brian E.

Roynestad at 25, Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (No. 98-83).
178. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 611.
179. See id. at 611-12 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)).

180. See id.
181. See id. at 612-14. See also Tourtillott, supranote 160, at447& n.22 (explaining
the Court's directive in Michigan v.Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 702 (1981), that an officer
can "take only those actions authorized by the warrant, unless he can show that [the
actions in question] are reasonably related to a legitimate law enforcement interest or
are necessary to ensure safety").
182. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 612; Brief for Federal Respondents at 14, Wilson (No.
98-83).
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Court admitted that some unspecified law enforcement objectives might
be met by the presence of the media, such "generalized law enforcement
objectives" did not outweigh the Fourth Amendment interests at stake.'83
Furthermore, the Court stressed that the officers' claim ignored the right
to residential privacy inherent in the Fourth Amendment." 4
Next, the Court addressed a First Amendment argument that
allowing the media presence would facilitate accurate reporting while
furthering the law enforcement purpose of publicizing the government's
efforts to combat crime.'8 5 The Court, in essence, applied a balancing
test between competing First and Fourth Amendment concerns. While
the Court acknowledged the importance of the media in keeping the
public informed of matters pertaining to the administration of criminal
justice,'8 6 it found that interest to be less important than the Fourth
Amendment right of freedom from intrusion into the home in the
present case.'87
Finally, the Court gave little credence to the officers' argument that
the presence of media representatives might serve to protect suspects by
curbing police abuse, as well as to protect the safety of the officers.'
The Court observed that the reporters from the Washington Post were not
in the Wilson home to protect either the Wilsons or the officers. 8 9
Rather, the reporters were acting for their own commercial purposes, as
evidenced in part by the fact that the newspaper, and not the police,
retained possession of the photographs."9
Taken together, the arguments raised by the marshals and deputy
sheriffs lacked persuasiveness to convince the Court that the media
presence in a home could be justified.'9 ' The Court concluded that
bringing members of the media into a home during execution of a
warrant, when their presence does not aid in the execution of that
warrant, violates the Fourth Amendment. 92
183. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 612.
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. Seeid. at612-13.
187. See id. at 613. The Court found the Fourth Amendment took precedence in this
case: "Surely the possibility of good public relations for the police is simply not
enough, standing alone, to justify the ride-along intrusion into a private home." Id.
188. See id.
189. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 613.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 614. The Court concluded that "[t]he reasons advanced by
respondents, taken in their entirety, fall short ofjustifying the presence of media inside
a home." Id.
192. See id. The Court did not limit the holding to media; it applies to other third
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QualifiedImmunity

Having established that the officers' conduct in this case did, in
fact, violate the Fourth Amendment, the Court next addressed the issue
of whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity.' 93 The
Court: stated that prior decisions had established that government
officials performing discretionary functions enjoy a qualified immunity
from liability for civil damages when their conduct, even though
unlawful, does not violate a clearly established right "of which a
reasonable person would have known."' 94 According to the Court's
definition, the parameters of the right must be sufficiently clear so that
a reasonable official would know whether or not his conduct fell within
proscribed boundaries.'9 5 The Court noted that the very act in question
must not have been previously held unlawful, but the unlawfulness must
be apparent to a reasonable officer in light of existing law.' 96
The Court considered the argument that any violation of the Fourth
Amendment is violating a clearly established right.' 97 Not only had the
Wilsons made this assertion, the dissent in the appellate decision
premised its argument on that basis.9 " The Court opined that the right
at issue must be assessed with a much greater degree of specificity.' 9 9
The Court narrowed its inquiry to the question of whether, in this case,
a reasonable officer would have known that bringing members of the
media into a home during the execution of a warrant would violate
Fourth Amendment rights. °°
parties as well. See id.
193. See id.The Court wrote, "A court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity
,must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual
constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation."' Id.at 609 (quoting Conn v. Gabbert,
526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999)).
194. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818
(1982)).
195. See id. at 614-15. The Court further determined that whether an official may
be held personally liable or find relief in qualified immunity "generally turns on the
'objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that
were 'clearly established' at the time it was taken." Id.at 614 (quoting Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987)).
at 615 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,.640 (1987)).
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.The Court posited that "the right allegedly violated must be defined at
the appropriate level of specificity before a court can determine if it was clearly
established." Id.(citing Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)). See also
supra note 160 and accompanying text.
200. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615.
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The Court concluded that an officer in April 1992 could reasonably
have believed this conduct was lawful.2"' Media ride-alongs had
become a routine police practice, and no judicial opinions existed as of
that date holding media accompaniment into a home to be unlawful. °2
Moreover, the only published decision directly on point was a state
intermediate court decision that found such conduct was not unreasonable. 2 3 The Court also noted two unpublished district court decisions
referred to by the parties that upheld media entry on searches in the
home, albeit not on Fourth Amendment grounds.2" In the Court's view,
these three cases did not clearly establish that a Fourth Amendment
violation occurred when police allowed the media accompanied access
into the home. 2°5 Even a Sixth Circuit case decided five weeks before
the events of this case did not sway the Court from its opinion that the
law on third-party entry into homes was not clearly established in April
1992.2o Because the Wilsons could not point to any controlling case
law in their jurisdiction, nor identify a consensus of persuasive
authority, the Court concluded that reasonable officers could have
believed this conduct was lawful.0 7
In holding that the right to be free from third-party entry during the
execution of a warrant was not clearly established, the Court further
relied on the United States Marshals Service ride-along policy. 28 This
policy anticipated the likelihood of media entry into homes when
accompanying officers on fugitive apprehension arrests."° The Court
noted that the Montgomery County Sheriff's Department also had a
ride-along policy that allowed media entry into private homes.1 ° Such
201. See id. The court claimed, "the constitutional question presented by this case
is by no means open and shut." Id.
202.

See id. at 616.

203. See id. See also supra note 112 (discussing Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768
(Wis. App. 1980)).
204. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 616. See also supra note 112 (referring to Moncriefv.
Hanton, 10 Media L. Rep. 1620 (N.D. Ohio 1984), and Higbee v. Times-Advodcate,
5 Media L. Rep. 2372 (S.D. Cal. 1980)).
205.

See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 616.

206. See id.at 616-17. The Court did not see as controlling Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d
697 (6th Cir. 1992), a case precluding summary judgment on the question of whether
police exceeded the scope of a search warrant by allowing a security guard to look for
stolen property that was not mentioned in the warrant. See id.
207. See id. at 617.
208. See id.
209. See id.

210. See id. However, "[i~n contrast to the written policy of the Marshal's Service,
the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office had no established procedures applicable to
media ride-alongs." Brief of Respondents Mark A. Collins, Eric E. Runion, and Brian
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policies could not be relied on if contrary to established case law, 21' but
because the law was not clearly established at this time, the Court found
it reasonable that officers would rely on the departmental policies."'
At the conclusion of its opinion, the Court noted the significant
split that had since developed among the federal circuits on the question
of police liability when the media accompany them into homes.2 3 The
Court deemed it unfair to subject the police to money damages for a
constitutional issue that federal appellatejudges had not agreed upon.2 14
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals.2 1
B.

Dissenting Opinion

While Justice Stevens agreed with the Court's holding that
unlawful media entry into a home violates the Fourth Amendment, he
disagreed on the issue of qualified immunity. 6 Justice Stevens rejected
the majority's reasoning that the absence ofajudicial opinion directly
on point justified an officer's conduct in bringing media into private
homes.217 In Justice Stevens' view, a specific judicial ruling on media
entry into homes was not required because Fourth Amendment
protections had been clearly established long before April 1992.21 In
furtherance of his argument that a reasonable officer would have
understood the relevant law despite the absence of established law on
the precise issue, Justice Stevens quoted the testimony of the sheriff of
Montgomery County who, despite the lack of a ruling on media entry
into homes, would not have engaged in similar conduct due to its
apparent unlawfulness.2 19
E. Roynestad at 3, Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999) (No. 98-83).
211. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See id.
Seeid. at618.
See id.
See id.
See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 618 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).

217. See id. at 621 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
218. See id. at 619-20 (Stevens, J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice
Stevens posits: "The clarity of the constitutional rule, a federal statute (18 U.S.C. §
3105), common-law decisions, and the testimony ofthe senior law enforcement officer
all support my position that it has long been clearly established that officers may not
bring third parties into private homes to witness the execution of a warrant." Id. at 619
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
219. See id at 624 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "We
would never let a civilian into a home.... That's just not allowed." Id. (Stevens, J.,
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Finally, Justice Stevens discussed what he considered the most
disturbing aspect of the Court's ruling.22
After determining the
officers' conduct violated the protections of the Fourth Amendment, the
Court nonetheless granted qualified immunity due, in part, to its reliance
on the public relations document prepared by the United States Marshals
Service. 22 ' Although the document mentioned ride-alongs, Justice
Stevens maintained the document did not purport to train officers in this
endeavor or to regulate their conduct, or that of the media.222 In Justice
Stevens' opinion, that the Court would think that well-trained professionals would rely on a public service announcement to guide them in
their duties, rather than generally known principles of law, was an idea
too preposterous for the Court to even consider.22 3
V. SIGNIFICANCE

Twenty-five years ago, Justice Rehnquist opined that if the
constitutional balance were to swing in favor of privacy, other societal
values would suffer.224 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has
since demonstrated its willingness to derogate privacy values when
competing interests have been involved. 225 Despite the watering down
of general Fourth Amendment protections, the Wilson Court refused to
strip away the protection afforded the home. In a rare, unanimous

concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 40, Wilson (No.
98-83)).
220. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 624 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
22 1. See id. at 617.
222. See id. at 624-25 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
223. See id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Brief for
Petitioner at 44, Wilson (No. 98-83) (supporting Justice Stevens' argument, the officers
stated that not only would they not rely on such a policy, they did not even know at the
time that one existed).
224. See William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of PrivacyConsistent with Fair
and Effective Law Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You've Come a Long Way, Baby, 23 KAN. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1974).
225. See, e.g., Vemonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995)
(finding invasion of privacy claim outweighed by school's interest in random drug
testing of students who participate in interscholastic sports); California v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988) (holding no expectation of privacy in trash left in opaque bags
at curb), California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 214 (1986) (finding no expectation of
privacy from aerial surveillance); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 772 (1966)
(upholding blood sample of intoxicated person taken by physician despite patient's
objections).
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Fourth Amendment decision,226 the Court reaffirmed centuries-old
common law traditions upholding the sanctity of the home.
In ruling that media ride-alongs into the home violate the Fourth
Amendment, Wilson also sent a message to an overly aggressive media.
While the First Amendment clearly provides for a free press, the right
to gather that news does not stand absolute.
What remains unclear from Wilson is the impact this decision will
have on the media ride-alongs. Though producers of the popular reality
television programs were reportedly "unfazed" by the recent Supreme
Court decision,227 other journalists have acknowledged that Wilson
signals the end of the media ride-along into the home.22 And while the
reality producers insist their shows will remain strong, skeptics think
otherwise. Some reporters predict that fear of liability and money
damages will cause law enforcement officers to overreact and abolish
the ride-along practice completely. 29
Others, however, insist the Wilson holding is a narrow one and will
have little effect on media activities; with a few modifications, the
media will carry on business as usual.230 Indeed, since Wilson is limited
to home invasions, it does not restrict the media from accompanying
officers and televising arrests made on the street or in public places.2 3 1
Arguably, following Wilson, some media practices will have to be
amended. While the Court declined to address all aspects of media ridealongs, Wilson's message centered clearly on the media presence in the
home.2 3 ' Before Wilson, camera crews would accompany officers on
226. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Along for the Ride, 31 NAT'LJ. 1448 (1999).
227. See Greg Braxton, ProducersSay Ruling Won't Affect Shows: COPS and Others
Claim PrivacyIssues Are Already Addressed, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 1999, at F4.
228. See Kurt Wimmer, Supreme CourtRuling in "Ride-Along"' Case May Spell Doom
for Practice,NEWS PHOTOGRAPHER, July I, 1999; David G. Savage, Media Ride-Alongs
Struck Down, A.B.A. J.,July 1999, at 38; Taylor, supra note 226.
229. See Wimmer, supra note 228. "The issue is what a cautious law enforcement
community will do when it weighs the risks and benefits of media participation in
enforcement activities." Wimmer, supranote 228. Wimmer further asserts that Wilson
"if read too broadly could have a significant chilling effect on media coverage of police
activities." Wimmer, supra note 228.
230. See Wimmer, supra note 228; Greg Braxton, supra note 227, at F4.
231. See Tony Mauro, High CourtRulings ForeverChange RelationshipBetween Media.
Law Enforcement, THE FREEDOM FORUM ONLINE (visited May 25, 1999)
<http://www.freedomforum.org/press/1 999/5/25sctmediaridealongs.asp>. "The Court
drew a bright line at the doorstep of private homes. Outside that line, in areas that are
visible or accessible to the public, the court ruling implied that the media could
continue to observe police activity." Id
232. See id "The decision was about home, home, home. I'm sure that if you did
a word count, 'home' would be the most commonly used word." Id
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raids into the home and seek permission or releases from the homeowners afterwards. Now, in order to enter a home, the media will seemingly
have to obtain permission beforehand-eliminating the elements of
surprise and drama common to the reality shows. Reporters may still
trail officers on the street and from the curb, and obtain footage there,
if the law enforcement officers wish to continue the practice. But Wilson
drew the bright line-the sanctity of the home has been preserved.
With respect to the Court's qualified immunity analysis, the
question arises as to when a police officer will be expected to objectively know that a right has been clearly established. Chief Justice
Rehnquist made the point that the official action in question need not
have been previously held unlawful. However, he then proceeded to
base the bulk of his analysis on whether any court had previously held
media ride-alongs into homes unlawful.233
Contrary to Justice
Rehnquist's assertion, plaintiffs will have a difficult time proving a
police officer should objectively know his or her conduct is unlawful
without a prior judicial ruling on the matter.
Likewise, the Court made it clear that, in deciding whether a right
is clearly established, it is going to view that right very narrowly."'
Justice Stevens would have decided the issue based on a much higher
level of generality of Fourth Amendment rights than the majority. The
majority stressed that an officer cannot be made to interpret nebulous,
abstract principles. Realistically, the only way an officer will know
whether his conduct is unlawful according to clearly established
guidelines is if courts have expressly ruled on the lawfulness of the
specific issue prior to the challenged conduct.
By holding that officers violate the Fourth Amendment by bringing
members of the media into a private residence, the Supreme Court in
Wilson v. Layne 2 " clearly established that media ride-alongs into the
home are not constitutionally protected. Privacy prevails-at least in
this episode.
DeLeith Duke Gossett*

233. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615.
234. See id.
235. 526 U.S. 603 (1999).
* J.D. expected May 2001; B.S.E., 1998, University of Central Arkansas.

